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'I was interested to read your letter and would like to make my observations on the "Duress v DD243" problem … from the point of view of a manufacturer, and with the benefit of extensive discussions at the BSIA.

The specific requirement of clause 6.4.5 is that "completion of unsetting should be achieved … by means of portable ACE". Note that this does NOT specify that there must not be a keypad present, or that the keypad not be live – merely that completion of unsetting should be carried out by means of a portable ACE. Whilst it is reasonable that there should be means to prevent unsetting by means of a PIN code, there can be no legitimate enforcement of one particular technique to achieve this goal mandated by any organisation.

Possibilities include an unsetting device with no keys, or disabling the keys of the keypad until the system is unset – or until it is alarm condition.

Also possible is the provision of means to prevent PIN codes being programmed for/by users … or even bringing programming of codes etc entirely under engineer control.

However, what this clause does NOT do is bar the deliberate creation of an alarm by means of a PIN code. In fact, the scope of DD243 specifically states that "Personal attack (hold up) alarms … are beyond the scope of DD243". This basically means that no provision of DD243 can in any way change the status quo as far as the use of any kind of personal attack alarm – including the use of Duress Codes to unset the system. At the end of the day, there is nothing in DD243 itself to prevent your customer from having the facilities that he has requested. The problem is that the interpretation of DD243 by certain organisations has been forced on the industry in a way that makes this difficult.

Moreover, you may be glad to know that equipment does exist that makes it possible to meet this requirement – including the Castle Euro Meridian range – for anyone who is prepared to argue compliance with DD243 rather than any narrow-minded interpretation of it!"