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However, opportunities for reducing crime, improving detections and wasting less police call-out time are still being lost, and there is much more that has yet to be done to ensure that all alarms, whether monitored or not, are installed and operated to the highest possible standards.

As a result, ACPO is looking for new ways of working with the industry to improve alarm system performance. Given the very clear efforts of installers and monitoring stations to date, attention is now beginning to focus on how those who inspect security systems actually operate in the real world. Until now, an area that has been totally neglected by ACPO.

Confusion over relative standards
There are two main inspection bodies for security systems, namely the National Security Inspectorate (NSI) and the Security Systems and Alarms Inspection Board (SSAIB). It's clear, however, that the relationship between these two organisations is somewhat less than 'loving', and there's also considerable confusion about relative standards and the interaction between inspected companies and the inspectorates themselves.

Work is currently being conducted alongside both the NSI and the SSAIB to establish whether or not improved consistency can be brought to this area of the security equation. In any case, it's worth looking at the issues involved. It must be remembered at all times that without accreditation from one of the inspectorates, no company will be able to obtain a Unique Reference Number (URN) from their local constabulary.

What ACPO really needs as an outcome from security systems inspections is the adherence to consistent, transparent, sensible and independently verified standards by accredited companies, a regime of inspection which constantly improves performance, an effective complaints system and – as a last resort – a robust disciplinary process for any companies who repeatedly fail to meet the standards as laid down.

At present the inspectorates – one more so than the other – appear to be far more interested in internecine warfare and personal attacks than seeking a common and progressive way in which to move the industry forwards. It's appreciated that they're operating in a commercial environment and are in competition with each other, but surely the pool is big enough for two inspectorate bodies to make a reasonable living even if they were to work to an agreed standard and within an accommodating operational protocol?

Working in different ways
As things stand, the inspectorates work to different standards and in different ways. Their principle pre-occupation (certainly true of one of them, at least) is how it might be able to put the other out of business by repeatedly stating that there should be only one inspectorate in any case.

While this is an understandable sentiment from a commercial viewpoint, it's hardly very pragmatic as there are likely to be at least the two of them for the foreseeable future. Unless, of course, they manage to cobble together a marriage which, given the venom that's being spat at the moment, seems a tad unlikely.

The potential for effective systems inspection and playing a key role in improving performance from within the industry is very significant, which makes the present climate and established relationships just a little frustrating.

So what is the challenge ACPO is putting out to the inspectorates, and indeed the private security industry at large? First, there must only be one clear and agreed inspection standard and methodology against which companies are assessed. That standard must be sufficiently robust to guarantee that performance constantly improves.

The whole process and outcome of accreditation is opaque, and its effectiveness unknown. Both security industry inspectorates should obtain from each company they accredit some form of independent assessment as to how their systems perform. This process s

Second, the audit regime for the inspectorate bodies themselves must be far more transparent and effective. The $64,000 question is whether a new model is needed, because the current one has certainly outlived its usefulness.

What about an operational protocol?
Third, there needs to be some kind of mechanism in place – an operational protocol, perhaps? – which prevents a company that's being disciplined (or threatened with discipline) from leaving one inspectorate and subsequently joining another because of a different (and lower) interpretation of standards. Discipline is intended to have a negative impact on the offending company, not to provide a new market opportunity for the other inspectorate.

Rumour on the street has it that a major player in the industry is now threatening one inspectorate that it will move its business elsewhere if formal disciplinary proceedings eventually begin…

Fourth – and arguably most important of all – the whole process and outcome of accreditation is opaque, and its effectiveness unknown. Both inspectorates should obtain from each company they accredit some form of independent assessment as to how their systems perform. This process should be managed in a statistically sound way such that sensible comparisons may then be made between companies.

In turn, this will provide a satisfactory benchmark against which judgements can be made about not only individual companies but also the performance of each inspectorate out there. In simple terms, this would tell us exactly who is best at doing the job. In addition, year-on-year a check could then be made as to whether a constant improvement in performance by companies and inspectorates alike is being realised.

Competition in the private sector
Of course, it's accepted that this enhanced performance by inspectorates would be difficult and hard to deliver, but one is perfectly entitled to ask what the complex inspection regime is achieving (if not improved performance).

I can already hear the diversionary screams of "impossible", "impractical", "unfair", "expensive" and "too difficult", not to mention: "What right has the complacent and inefficient police service to demand anything?" echoing down the corridor, and yet more pins being stuffed into my effigy. But why?

I have always laboured under the impression that the private sector welcomes competition and direct comparison of performance because it drives the cowboys out of town. Surely those companies who have reliable systems would like to see their names at the top of a national league table, while the inspectorate that helps put them there basks in reflected glory? If each inspectorate is the 'best' or 'best for a particular market sector' (as they say they are), then let's see the evidence. I'm pretty certain that Professor Martin Gill at PRCI could work up some highly useful information if he were tasked to do so.

A need for improved reliability
Despite the unequivocal improvements in performance made by the industry as a whole of late, some alarms are still suspect. Like it or not, for as long as the private security industry relies on the police service to provide any sort of 'first response', the more it will need to see improved reliability. I bet any of Security Management Today's readers a pound to a penny that if 'first response' were to be 'privatised', better performance management and transparency from the inspectorates would be seen to happen overnight.

The time is now right to acknowledge the success of the wider industry, and shift the focus on to the inspectorates. Let us invite them to 'get real', and recognise that if they're to have a solid future in this industry then they'd jolly well better prove they're worth it. They can do this by either getting together to provide a common inspection standard, or at the very least call a ceasefire and look to become more constructive.