The term 'suicide bomber' conjures up a slightly forlorn image which it's important we modify. It's more appropriate to view these individuals as 'guided weapons'. They have a particular target firmly fixed in their mind, and will only be deterred by an actual physical barrier or block of some kind that means they cannot reach their intended final destination.
We also know that, once challenged by anyone in officialdom, they'll readily detonate their bomb(s). In fact, that's exactly what has happened in most of the recent attacks. Thus the ability to apprehend someone in the target zone isn't likely to work.
The key is to establish stand-off zones that will minimise damage by stopping the bomber some distance from the building/target. In the case of the bomb at the JW Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, the vehicle search point was some way away from the main entrance to the hotel. That alone saved many hundreds of lives.
Do we need to change 'security'?
What does all of this mean for security practice here in the UK, though? My own take on the matter of suicide bombers is that they haven't brought about as many changes as might have been expected.
There's also a misconception out there that the only possible target for such an attack on home shores would be in London. As we've seen, attacks have taken place the world over and not just in capital cities. Arrests of Al-Qaeda suspects have recently been conducted in Gloucester, Blackburn and Manchester. We need to be thinking about what might be seen as either a prestige target or a soft target from a security point of view.
All properties in your company's portfolio have to be looked at again in the light of these new threats. A key issue is their proximity to obvious prestige targets. Al-Qaeda followers want their attacks to achieve massive publicity and – if at all possible – mass casualties.
Another important issue is to prevent vehicles from being driven close to buildings. This could involve modifications to the way in which parking or access is organised, or even building structures further back from the road. Where access is controlled by anti-vehicle barriers, these should always be located well away from the building.
Delicate discussions with both police and local councils may be needed to garner their support. This is gaining importance as Governments 'harden' their buildings (thus potentially driving would-be terrorists out into the softer commercial or residential areas).
While difficult to organise in the short term, it's also worth considering whether or not it's possible to redistribute members of staff so that fewer of them are located in the more vulnerable parts of a building.
A degree of complacency has crept in because the UK mainland hasn’t been the subject of a terror attack post-9/11. People have become immune to the barrage of information about threat levels being up or down, and have difficulty in connecting such reports
Security managers also need to think about the issue of electricity distribution. We're aware of some cases where the main building and 'hot site' back-up supply were directly affected because they were both inside the outage area.
Systematic assistance: an essential
A number of bodies are now stepping in to provide more systematic assistance to security professionals. In Project Unicorn, for example ('Holmes leads City fight against terrorist threats', News Update, SMT, July 2003, p7), the Metropolitan Police has been reviewing the provision of threat information and the content of security briefings provided to the business community, and how these might be improved.
Internationally, the CBI and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have launched the Security Information Service for Business Overseas in order to provide better intelligence for those travelling and working abroad.
What of the role of The Security Institute in all of this? Having gaps in knowledge or being insufficiently qualified for a particular security role has never held such potential for disastrous consequences. A major focus of the Institute is to ensure that security practitioners attain the right level of qualifications and experience, and then recognise that fact by affording them professional status.
Widespread achievement of professional status is just one side of the equation. Raising standards of security provision across the board is also dependent upon employers making a good, objective decision when recruiting security personnel. The Institute therefore promotes to employers the importance of recognising the value of that formal professional status as a way of removing uncertainty and subjectivity from the recruitment process.
The need to take a completely systematic approach to security – and maintain high standards at all times – has never been more important. The Institute helps practitioners maintain the correct professional standards by producing Best Practice guides (witness the 'Guide to the Procurement and Management of Manned Security Services', with the next one likely to focus on CCTV) which draw on the experiences of a wide range of experts to provide a completely structured approach to particular aspects of security provision.
Challenges are ever-changing
It will take at least a decade for the strategies currently being deployed by police and the intelligence services worldwide to take full effect in terms of neutralising the Al-Qaeda-related terror networks. Even if that status quo is reached, we should not rest on our laurels.
Recent developments are merely indicative of the fact that the challenges facing security practitioners have risen a few notches in recent years, and that isn't going to change.
Source
SMT
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