In fact, a thorough review of British nuclear security regulations had been underway prior to 9/11, the most significant development being announced in October 2000 with the news that the civil nuclear industry's security regulator – formerly the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority's (UKAEA) Directorate of Civil Nuclear Security – would be transferred to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) and duly renamed the Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS).
At the time, the selling point for this move was independence. Energy minister Helen Liddell stated: "The change puts the OCNS on a new footing as a Government regulator, re-establishing it as a visibly independent part of the civil nuclear industry. The OCNS will operate as an independent unit within the DTI, enjoying full autonomy in regulatory and operational matters."
However, 9/11 accelerated the process of separating the policing of the industry from the industry itself. The UKAEA Constabulary, whose officers protect civil nuclear licensed sites, is to be transferred to the DTI under a statutory police authority in April 2005. Its powers have now been considerably extended. Numbers have been stepped up since 9/11 to accommodate 600-plus officers in the 'force'.
2003: Regulating the installations
The Nuclear Installations Security Regulations 2003 – devised under the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, made law from March 22 and now enforced by the OCNS – will allow the Constabulary to exercise its powers in an emergency at civil licensed sites. These include UKAEA, British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL), URENCO (the provider of uranium enrichment services) and other sites.
The Agency's officers now enjoy the powers of a constable within 5 km of the limits of civil nuclear sites. They may also go wherever it seems expedient to safeguard certain types of nuclear material being transported or stored during transportation, or to pursue and arrest anyone suspected of interfering with nuclear material under safeguard. Officers have powers in advance of the arrival of any nuclear material to police areas where the material is being moved from one form of transport to another.
There has always been a need for stringent security planning in the sector, but since legislation was piecemeal there was always the possibility of varying standards. The 2003 Regulations set out what elements an approved plan must contain, as applied to all civil installations. It means that operators will have to update and re-submit all of their security plans for approval.
However, under transitional arrangements those operators who have already devised plans under previous legislation will continue to comply with these obligations until there's an approved security plan under the new Regulations for their premises.
Secure transport of nuclear materials
In terms of nuclear transport, there has been a shift of responsibility from the civil nuclear operators towards the carriers themselves for ensuring transport safety. Previously, civil companies that subcontracted carriers were ultimately held responsible for safe transport and delivery. Under the 2003 Regulations, certain categories of nuclear material will have to be transported by approved carriers, with responsibility for ensuring that only approved carriers handle such material resting with the "responsible person" for nuclear premises.
The Trade and Industry Secretary will approve carriers, or – where necessary – revoke that approval. Approvals will only be granted once carriers have submitted a transport security statement to the minister which has subsequently been ratified. Carriers also have an obligation to make sure that staff identified in their approved transport security statements are ratified by the Secretary of State as being suitable. These provisions are not due to come into force until 22 September this year. Penalties for unauthorised disclosure of sensitive nuclear information have been toughened up, with a prison sentence of up to seven years now a very real possibility.
How much is all of this 'regulation' going to cost? For the time being Whitehall doesn't want to say. An official Home Office statement reads: "While we cannot provide a breakdown of funding to the individual agencies for security reasons, the national security and intelligence agencies received overall funding in excess of £990 million in 2002/2003, and will receive more than £1,099 million in 2003/2004. This funding covers all the work carried out by the agencies, not just counter-terrorism, and represents an annual increase of 6.4%."
Tellingly, neither does the Department of Trade and Industry release details of the budget for the OCNS.
Nuclear security: BNFL's experience
What, in practice, does all of this mean for the civil nuclear industry? Dr Roger Howsley is head of security for BNFL, based at Risley in Cheshire. He too was cautious about giving precise figures, but informed Security Management Today (SMT) that the company's budget for security is now somewhere between 20% and 30% up on what it had been prior to 9/11. That said, planning for counter-terrorism is nothing new.
How much is all of this ‘regulation’ going to cost? Well, for the time being Whitehall doesn’t want to say. Officials constantly cite a particular dilemma about explaining security measures in that if too much detail is given the securit
"The threat of IRA terrorism has been a part of our planning process for decades," adds Howsley. "Government has demanded very stringent standards, and the industry is expected to self-fund the changes involved."
Dr Howsley is fully in favour of the new regulations. "The previous legislation evolved in a piecemeal fashion over decades," he stressed. "One observer even described it as "a dog's breakfast".
The very first plants were built for the weapons programme, with commercial power stations following on at a later date, and being viewed as separate entities. Dr Howsley continues: "The rules and regulations were different then. There were Government directives, and then the Nuclear Generating Stations (Security) Regulations appeared in 1996. These differed from the directives. The new regulations have swept away the old regime, while maintaining the best of the old regulations. A single set of regulations now relates to all civil sites."
Howsley also told SMT that having to re-submit security plans is something of an inconvenience. "We have always had to do this in some form or another," states Dr Howsley, "but now it all has to be done again. We have until 22 June to sketch out our ideas."
It looks as though the OCNS has bite, then. It's now independent, and has the necessary power to take companies to court if necessary. Nonetheless, Dr Howsley views the change as an opportunity to work with the new regulator, and eloquently stated the case for the co-operative, voluntary approach.
"It's always better to seek assurances from companies that they have indeed complied with regulations, and ask them to submit evidence. This makes for far more transparent regulation. The regulator should then spot check rather than require full audits (every time)". For instance, this year BNFL has introduced a whole series of assurance programmes which it will share with the regulator.
This begs the question: what practical changes has BNFL made since 9/11? Here, Dr Howsley exhibits the same old caution on disclosure rules, but one immediate change has been to put a stop to the coach tours of the Sellafield reprocessing plant. Another obvious change is the introduction of road chicanes to slow traffic at the entrances to the company's nuclear sites. BNFL has also reviewed the security of its perimeter fences, and stepped up the use of detection equipment.
What of the much-publicised breaches of perimeter fencing by groups including Greenpeace post-9/11? Dr Howsley stressed that perimeter fences have much more to do with marking the boundary of a site than with any defence against intrusion.
"Even if they breached our fencing, terrorists would find it extremely difficult to get any further. We have detected these unauthorised entries very quickly," stresses Howsley.
Generally speaking, Dr Howsley believes the new regulations to be an honest attempt to clean up a messy and difficult-to-administer regulatory system. His only caveat is that the degree of bureaucracy that may be involved has yet to be tested.
Nonetheless, Dr Howsley stated: "I believe that we are better equipped than any other industry sector to stave off the terrorist threat."
Lessons from mainland Europe
A purely national snapshot of British nuclear security practice is not representative of the entire picture, of course. France and Germany as well as other European Union (EU) Member States will also have to review their security standards against a new yardstick created by the EU in the future (mainly due to two directives proposed by the European Commission earlier this year concerning the safe use of nuclear generation plants).
The change puts the Office for Civil Nuclear Security (OCNS) on a new footing as a Government regulator, re-establishing it as a visibly independent part of the civil nuclear industry. The OCNS will operate as an independent unit within the DTI, enjoying
Assuming that they are agreed upon, the first of these directives – concentrating on basic obligations and principles on the safety of nuclear installations, from design to decommissioning – includes common standards and verification procedures to ensure the safe operation of those plants using radioactive substances.
The second looks at the safe disposal (underground) of radioactive waste.
The legislation has been drafted in particular to deal with the impending enlargement of the EU to admit new eastern European Member States whose records on nuclear or general safety aren't always the best.
However, whether this legislation leads to any reforms in France – Europe's largest consumer of nuclear energy – will be hard to judge. In proposing ratification of a protocol to the UN Non-Proliferation Treaty to National Assembly deputies earlier this year, the French Government stressed the dangers of proliferation in other countries but said nothing about the reinforcement of nuclear safeguards in France itself.
This may not have been a typical note of Gallic Governmental superiority, as it is thought that these changes have recently been substantial. Since 9/11, it's reported that France has stepped up air defences at La Hague, strengthened the military guard at reactors and increased transport security across the board.
However, given that French officials view secrecy as a weapon in safeguarding the nation's nuclear materials and installations, publicly-available information is strictly limited.
When missing plutonium was reported in Japan last year, the giant French nuclear company COGECA asserted that its controls were so tight there was absolutely "no possibility" of such an incident happening in France. However, Greenpeace campaigners later intercepted a truck carrying plutonium from La Hague to Marcoule, claiming that they'd monitored this traffic for a year without being detected. Yves Marignac, co-ordinator of a report by WISE-Paris, supports the group's claims that security and risk are "much worse than officially stated".
In contrast to France, Germany has no facilities for processing radioactive nuclear waste, and faces a major problem in storing its estimated 24,000 tonnes of highly radioactive waste, as well as some 297,000 tonnes of less 'toxic' waste. As an intermediate measure, waste sent to La Hague in France for reprocessing has been subsequently transported to Gorleben in Lower Saxony with mixed results in the face of violent and well-publicised opposition.
Germany's nuclear safeguards are generally rated quite highly, but a powerful protest movement has developed in recent years. There have also been suspicions that some German business links may pose security threats. Back in April the director of a company supplying aluminium tubes to a Chinese aircraft corporation was detained for questioning, apparently on the grounds that the shipment was destined for North Korea.
In neighbouring Belgium, almost 60% of the national electricity supply is generated by seven reactors located at Doel and Tihange, and owned/operated by ELECTRABEL. Spent nuclear fuel, reprocessed in France during the 1990s, is now stored in deep geologic repositories. High level wastes are stored for 50 years at the country's central interim storage site at the Mol-Dessel nuclear power plant and research centre north of Antwerp.
Belgium has long-term experience of spent nuclear fuel transport, both within the country and abroad and by way of road, rail and sea. Indeed, the country claims an 'expertise' in the design of storage facilities.
Considerable underground research has been underway for over two decades at Mol, itself a priority site for the European Commission's plans for the geological disposal of the waste.
Source
SMT
No comments yet