星空传媒

The National Trust is one of Britain鈥檚 leading conservation charities, protecting over 200 historic houses and their collections of priceless paintings and furniture assembled by the grand families who once resided within.

As well as houses, the National Trust owns approximately 160 gardens, 245,000 hectares of countryside (including much in the Lake District) and almost 600 miles of coastline. Not a little responsibility, by any means.

The numerous stately homes and houses are open to the public from the beginning of this month right through until October. Five days each week, members of the general public 鈥� no less than 11 million of them every year, in fact 鈥� will tread the corridor carpets and traverse the stately rooms. Some of the homes boast 50 or 60 different rooms, while there are many little two up, two down cottages of just as much historical interest and significance to UK historians.

While the protected residences may differ in terms of size, context and overall importance to our national heritage, they are all under constant threat of attack from opportunist and, on occasion, 鈥榩rofessional鈥� thieves. That being the case, what protective measures and security policies has the Trust put in place?

Crime prevention: the response

Peter Gough and Dominic Pearson are directly responsible for all matters relating to security at Trust locations. They are tasked with crime prevention duties and the detection of break-ins at the earliest possible stage such that damage and loss is minimised as much as possible. These security professionals are ably assisted by 20 retired police officers who work for the Trust on a voluntary basis, investigating security incidents as and when they arise.

Having joined the Trust back in 1995 as its second in-house security manager, Peter Gough鈥檚 main responsibilities are to give the correct professional advice, conduct risk and threat assessments at each site and then provide his line managers with a security strategy for their approval. Those strategies will encompass physical, electronic and procedural security elements.

鈥淲e also audit existing security measures so that we can then make specific recommendations,鈥� adds Gough in an exclusive interview with SMT. 鈥淲e bring each location鈥檚 security up to a level which meets the core strategy. That might involve the addition of a revised CCTV set-up or the inclusion of a new alarm system.鈥�

Dealing with false alarms

To date, nearly 600 alarm systems have been installed throughout the Trust鈥檚 buildings. In some of the larger properties there are over 400 sensors and detection devices in place. Indeed, Peter now uses a hybrid combination of wired and wireless sensors (as well as audio sensors) to provide dual confirmation in line with the requirements laid down by DD243.

Each property contains one or more alarm systems as many of the houses are furnished with items worth thousands 鈥� and, in several cases, millions 鈥� of pounds. Although there may be few items of real value in some of the smaller properties, it鈥檚 still vitally important for the security team to know whether or not a forced entry is being attempted.

Irrespective of any 鈥榮ell-on鈥� value, the building contents have an importance related to their location. For example, former World War II Prime Minister Winston Churchill鈥檚 beloved fountain pen, which is currently on display at Chartwell, doesn鈥檛 have any real value as a fountain pen in its own right. However, the fact that it once belonged to the great man makes it a unique piece of memorabilia. 鈥淎ll of our properties and their contents are equally important to us,鈥� adds Gough in assertive tones.

From time to time, of course, false alarm activations will occur. As is the case for many other end users, this causes a major headache for Gough and Dominic Pearson in view of the present ACPO Security Systems Policy. That policy classifies all sites in the same way and, in essence, considers them all to be prone to the same risks. Peter Gough argues that different circumstances for different organisations or types of building should be taken into account and dealt with on an individual basis, and that a National Trust site with hundreds of sensors cannot possibly be considered equal to a corner shop with less than ten.

鈥淢ost stately homes are large houses with many rooms,鈥� comments Gough. 鈥淭hey are very old properties. Despite our best intentions and efforts, all of the windows and doors do not fit perfectly, and problems can arise with bats or birds flying in under doors or down chimney stacks, which then triggers the alarms.鈥� Not an easy problem for Gough and Pearson to tackle.

鈥淣ot only are the contents sometimes worth millions of pounds,鈥� continues Gough, 鈥渂ut they cannot be replaced on a like-for-like basis. Even if we were to receive the insurance money for a valuable painting or another work of art that had been stolen, we obviously couldn鈥檛 go out and buy the same item again. Once it鈥檚 gone, it鈥檚 gone. Good security is vital.鈥�

Quite obviously, the level of risk here is far greater than that posed for the corner shop. 鈥淭hat doesn鈥檛 seem to matter, though,鈥� sighs Gough. 鈥淭he ACPO policy states that if you have two false alarms in a given period your site is earmarked for a Level 2 response from the police. Five false alarms and that鈥檚 it. You鈥檙e off that list and left to fend for yourself.鈥�

Clearly, Gough is not enamoured of the police鈥檚 stance on the issue of attendance in response to alarm activations. He adds: 鈥淭oday, risk management is very much the name of the game and so we, just like our service providers, should be focusing on that topic. I鈥檓 not asking for any special treatment for The National Trust or indeed any other organisation. What I鈥檓 really saying is that, provided we can demonstrate we are doing all we possibly can to manage our false alarm situation, and are examining every alarm activation in detail and taking remedial measures, we would hope the police service will understand our position a little better and work with us to manage our risks by continuing to afford us a decent level of alarm response.鈥�

Interestingly, at this point in our conversation Gough readily admits that he would 鈥渉ave no problem whatsoever鈥� with paying a charge for a call-out to a false alarm. One suspects that many security managers are now of a like mind.

Conservation versus security

Throughout The National Trust鈥檚 estates, conservation has been 鈥� and always will be 鈥� the raison d鈥櫭猼re. Gough has had to discover ingenious ways of introducing alarm systems with the least amount of interference or disruption to the buildings鈥� fabric.

In this regard there are many challenges to be faced. What do you do when the room to be alarmed has a stone or marble floor, or the walls are adorned with a delicate leather finish that cannot be tampered with? The answer, it appears, is to use a hybrid arrangement of radio and wired sensors.

Movement and other detectors are fitted in the principal state rooms that are open to the public. These are all positioned very discreetly such that their visual impact is greatly lessened for visitors, yet they have to remain visible enough to serve as an active deterrent to the would-be thief.

Gough and Pearson take for granted the fact that criminals will visit Trust homes and look around for items they might attempt to steal at some juncture. They鈥檒l actively target rooms containing valuable objects. Microphones are fitted in all such rooms to provide audio verification, while vibration detectors on the windows catch early activations.

Sequential verification may well leave you investigating the cause of a single sensor activation without the presence of the police, which is a safety issue for key holders. Audio verification also allows our key holders to listen-in if the ARC operators cannot hear anything. This enables members of staff to better assess the areas they are about to enter

Peter Gough (security manager, The National Trust)

鈥淭he other thing we do is control the walk test indicators from the control panel,鈥� adds Gough. 鈥淲e do this for two reasons. First, we don鈥檛 want the walk test indicators flashing away because it鈥檚 a visual disturbance at a time when visitors are trying to appreciate the architecture, history and contents of a given space. Second, we absolutely do not want the potential thief to be able to determine what sensors are covering and in which area. Staff can enable the walk test indicators from the central alarm control panel, and carry out the walk test on the room in question.鈥�

Planning for system maintenance

System maintenance and/or upgrades are carried out during the winter when the buildings remain closed to the public. It鈥檚 a busy period, and one that requires careful planning 鈥� maintenance is never straightforward in a National Trust property. Even the simple task of running cabling under floorboards is a conservation nightmare because of the dust it creates.

Furniture needs to be moved and carefully stored away, adding to the cost of the whole exercise. Any items remaining in a given room, such as paintings or larger pieces of furniture, must be covered to protect them from dirt and dust accumulation. If the installation team is bringing in ladders, they鈥檒l first need to lay down protection on the floors and walls.

It鈥檚 the type of project that can take several weeks of painstaking work, with just two individuals from the alarm company and someone from the Trust鈥檚 direct labour team in attendance to lift floorboards, for instance, and assist as and when necessary.

The cost of conservation works may well be equivalent to 鈥� or alternatively work out more expensive than 鈥� the cost of replacing the entire alarm set-up. Wherever possible, then, Peter Gough will try to minimise conservation costs, and only spend funds on the actual alarm system itself. This is achieved by using existing wiring from Rios to sensors, which eliminates much of the building works.

Last winter, one of the major stately homes was subjected to a thorough maintenance programme, part of which entailed replacing the existing alarm control panel with a Galaxy panel supplied by Honeywell Security. The existing panel was non-standard, and had been causing continual problems. It was really a combination of the state of the electronics, which were quite old, and the condition of the main data highway. The wiring was probably 20 years old. New equipment had been connected to that old wiring, much of which was either brittle or corroding. As a consequence, false alarms were a constant problem.

The addition of a new control panel and substitution of the data highway involved removing the existing equipment, but at the same time retaining the Rio-to-sensor wiring. This process inevitably meant testing the wiring by measuring its insulation resistance between each core and core and ground on the sensor wiring.

Ideally, if the wiring had still been in good order, Gough would have been willing to reuse it. Replacing all of the wiring would inevitably involve major building works 鈥� burying cables into walls, taking up floorboards, etc. Replacement of the data highway, on the other hand, may be carried out 鈥榖ehind the scenes鈥�.

Single panel roll-out

Galaxy is the standard control panel now used in almost all of the Trust鈥檚 properties. Gough has specified Galaxy having become 鈥渄isenchanted鈥� with companies installing proprietary panels. A procedure which necessarily ties the Trust to those same organisations for ongoing maintenance and monitoring purposes. 鈥淨uite frankly, the systems we used to run were not performing, and we wanted the freedom to look elsewhere鈥� he suggests.

Apparently, Gough makes sure that he鈥檚 aware of what systems other large organisations 鈥� such as the retailers 鈥� are using to secure their premises. By and large, they鈥檒l tend to go with bigger organisations purely because the support structures are there. 鈥淓nd users who standardise with one type of panel across their premises will show the supplier that they鈥檙e worth supporting in their own right,鈥� adds Gough. 鈥淚f we have a problem we鈥檙e then able to rely on the manufacturer and installer to help us out,鈥� he concludes.

The National Trust鈥檚 alarm systems are monitored at a dedicated, external Alarm Receiving Centre (ARC) rather than in-house. They are currently using audio verification from ICM, backed up with sequential verification. The audio confirmation process can start and finish with only one sensor being tripped. If someone breaks in and only one sensor is triggered they can still verify the alarm, as Peter wants the earliest possible confirmation.

鈥淪equential verification may well leave you investigating the cause of a single sensor activation without the presence of the police, which is a safety issue for key holders,鈥� explains Gough. 鈥淎udio verification also allows our key holders to listen-in if the ARC operators cannot hear anything. This enables members of staff to better assess the areas they are about to enter.鈥�

The Trust is fortunate enough to have members of staff on site at all times across its properties, which in itself is a deterrent to criminals. 鈥淲e always have a duty manager on site,鈥� continues Gough.鈥�

Risk management in action

Gough and his fellow Trust security manager Dominic Pearson are 鈥渆xtremely thorough鈥� when it comes to risk management. They prepare detailed product specifications whenever a new alarm or CCTV system is required, as well as detailed designs (including photographs of those areas where alarms or cameras will need to be located).

Gough then employs regional installers, which he feels offer the Trust a better service combined with a far more personal approach to the project and host organisation in question. 鈥淲ith regional installers you鈥檙e always going to be an important customer,鈥� he reasons. 鈥淭he loss of our business would be significant to them, so they do everything they possibly can to look after us as a client.鈥�

Sadly, despite the best efforts of Gough, Pearson and their colleagues at The National Trust, attacks on stately homes remain significant in number. Burglary is a constant and serious threat. 鈥淭he thieves will target objects they can subsequently move on,鈥� sighs Gough. 鈥淪ome stolen items are probably transported to the continent, or sent by container to the States. The more anonymous items might be sold through unscrupulous dealers. It鈥檚 more than likely that the thieves who target our sites have links to criminal networks which can pass on the items really quickly and remove any trace back to them.鈥�

At the end of the day, the central challenge for The National Trust鈥檚 Security Department is to display each location as a lived-in house, depicting whatever period of history it belongs to, and not as a museum wherein every ornament and book is 鈥榟idden鈥� under glazed screens or locked down.

That requires a very special security regime both when the properties are open to the public and during closures for refurbishment. 鈥淭his challenge is what makes it the most interesting job I鈥檝e ever had,鈥� concludes Gough.